Working papers & Papers in Press

  • Balabanova N, Duong H, Hilbe C. Adaptive dynamics of direct reciprocity with N rounds of memory. arXiv, 2411.09535 💻

  • Pal S, Hilbe C, Glynatsi N. The co-evolution of direct, indirect and generalized reciprocity. arXiv, 2411.03488. 💻

  • Barfuss W, Flack J, Gokhale C, Hammond L, Hilbe C, Hughes E, Leibo JZ, Lenaerts T, Leonard NE, Levin S, Madhushani U, McAvoy A, Meylahn JM, Santos FP. Collective Cooperative Intelligence. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, in press.

  • McAvoy A, Madhusahani U, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Barfuss W, Su Q, Leonard NE, Plotkin JB. Unilateral incentive alignment in two-player games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, in press.

  • Rossetti CL, Hauser O, Hilbe C. Dynamics of cooperation in concurrent games. Nature Communications, in press.

2024

  • Glynatsi N, Akin E, Nowak MA, Hilbe C. Conditional cooperation with longer memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 121:e2420125121. 💻 📃

  • Murase Y, Hilbe C. Indirect reciprocity under opinion synchronization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 121:e2418364121. 💻 📃

  • Murase Y, Hilbe C. Computational evolution of social norms in well-mixed and group-structured populations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 121:e2406885121. 💻 📃

  • Glynatsi N, McAvoy A, Hilbe C. Evolution of reciprocity with limited payoff memory. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 291:20232493. 💻 📃

  • Hübner V, Staab M, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Kleshnina M. Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 121:e2315558121. 💻 📃

  • Rossetti CL, Hilbe C. Direct reciprocity among humans. Ethology, 130:e13407. 💻 📃

2023

  • Hilbe C, Kleshnina M, Stankova K. Evolutionary games and applications: Fifty years of the logic of animal conflict. Dynamic Games and Applications, 13:1035–1048.  💻 📃

  • Park HJ, Hilbe C, Nowak MA, Kim BJ, Jeong H-C. Vacancies in growing habitats promote the evolution of cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 575:111629.  💻 📃

  • Kleshnina* M, Hilbe* C, Simsa S, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature Communications, 14:4153.  💻 📃

  • Yohsuke M and Hilbe C. Indirect reciprocity with stochastic and dual reputation updates. PLoS Computational Biology, 19:e1011271.  💻 📃

  • LaPorte P, Hilbe C, Nowak MA. Adaptive dynamics of memory-1 strategies in the repeated donation game. PLoS Computational Biology, 19:e1010987.  💻 📃

  • Tkadlec J, Hilbe† C, Nowak† MA. Mutation enhances cooperation in direct reciprocity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 120:e2221080120.  💻 📃

  • Schmid L, Ekbatani F, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. Quantitative assessment can stabilize reciprocity under imperfect information. Nature Communications, 14:2086.  💻 📃

  • Wang X, Couto M, Wang N, An X, Chen B, Dong† Y, Hilbe† C, Zhang† B. Cooperation and coordination in heterogeneous populations. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 378:20210504.  💻 📃

2022

  • Murase Y, Hilbe C, Baek SK. Evolution of direct reciprocity in group-structured populations. Scientific Reports, 12: 18645.  💻 📃

  • Li J, Zhao X, Li B, Rossetti CL, Hilbe† C, Xia† H. Evolution of cooperation through cumulative reciprocity. Nature Computational Science, 2:677–686.  💻 📃

  • Pal S and Hilbe C. Reputation effects drive the joint evolution of cooperation and social rewarding Nature Communications, 13:5928.  💻 📃

  • McAvoy A, Kates-Harbeck J, Chatterjee K, Hilbe C. Evolutionary instability of selfish learning in repeated games PNAS Nexus, 4:pgac141.  💻 📃

  • Schmid L, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces. PLoS Computational Biology, 18(6):e1010149.  💻 📃

  • Couto MC, Giaimo S, Hilbe C. Introspection dynamics: A simple model of counterfactual learning in asymmetric games. New Journal of Physics, 24:063010.  💻 📃

  • Park P, Nowak MA, Hilbe, C. Cooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints. Nature Communications, 13:737.  💻 📃

  • Rossetti C, Hilbe C, Hauser, OP. (Mis)perceiving cooperativeness. Current Opinion in Psychology, 43:151–155.  💻 📃

2021

  • Schmid L, Shati P, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity. Scientific Reports, 11:17443.  💻 📃

  • Schmid L, Chatterjee K, Hilbe† C, Nowak† MA. A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour, 5:1292–1302.  💻 📃

2020

  • Donahue K, Hauser O, Nowak MA, Hilbe C. Evolving cooperation in multichannel games. Nature Communications, 11:3885.  💻 📃

  • Milutinovic B, Stock M, Grasse AV, Naderlinger E, Hilbe C, Cremer S. Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens. Ecology Letters, 23:565–574.  💻 📃

2019
  • Hauser* O, Hilbe* C, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. Social dilemmas among unequals. Nature, 572:524–527.  💻 📃
2018

  • Hilbe C, Schmid L, Tkadlec J, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115:12241–12246.  💻 📃

  • Hilbe C, Simsa S, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature, 559: 246–249.  💻 📃

  • Hoffman* M, Hilbe* C, Nowak MA. The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds. Nature Human Behaviour, 2: 397–404.  💻 📃

  • Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour, 2: 469–477.  💻 📃

  • Reiter* JG, Hilbe* C, Rand DG, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness. Nature Communications, 9: 555.  💻 📃

2017

  • Veller C, Hayward LK, Hilbe C, Nowak MA The Red Queen and King in finite populations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114: E5396–E5405.  💻 📃

  • Hilbe* C, Martinez-Vaquero* LA, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA Memory-n strategies of direct reciprocity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114: 4715–4720.  💻 📃

2016

  • Hilbe C, Hagel K, Milinski M. Asymmetric power boosts extortion in an economic experiment. PLoS One, 11: e0163867.  💻 📃

  • Abou Chakra M, Hilbe C, Traulsen A. Coevolutionary interactions between farmers and mafia induce host acceptance of avian brood parasites. Royal Society Open Science, 3: 160036.  💻 📃

  • Baek, SK, Jeong H-C, Hilbe C, Nowak MA Comparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity. Scientific Reports, 6: 25676.  💻 📃

  • Milinski M, Hilbe C, Seemann D, Sommerfeld RD, Marotzke J. Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation through extortion. Nature Communications, 7: 10915.  💻 📃

  • Yeates JAM, Hilbe C, Zwick M, Nowak MA, Lehman N. Dynamics of prebiotic RNA reproduction illuminated by chemical game theory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113: 5030–5035.  💻 📃

2015

  • Hilbe C, Hoffman M, Nowak MA Cooperate without looking in a non-repeated game Games, 6: 458–472.  💻 📃

  • Hilbe C, Traulsen A, Sigmund K. Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Games and Economic Behavior, 92: 41–52.  💻 📃

  • Hilbe C, Wu B, Traulsen A, Nowak MA Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 374: 115–124.  💻 📃

2014

  • Miska C, Hilbe C, Mayer S. Reconciling different views on responsible leadership: A rationality-based approach. Journal of Business Ethics, 125: 349–360.  💻 📃

  • Hilbe C, Wu B, Traulsen A, Nowak MA. Cooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111: 16425–16430.  💻 📃

  • Abou Chakra M, Hilbe C, Traulsen A. Plastic behaviors in hosts promote the emergence of retaliatory parasites. Scientific Reports, 4: 4251.  💻 📃

  • Hilbe C, Röhl T, Milinski M. Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner’s dilemma. Nature Communications, 5: 3976.  💻 📃

  • Hilbe C, Traulse A., Röhl T, Milinski M. Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111: 752–756.  💻 📃

  • Schoenmakers S, Hilbe C, Blasius B, Traulsen A. Sanctions as honest signals: The evolution of punishment by public sanctioning institutions. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 356: 36–46.  💻 📃

2013

  • Hilbe C, Nowak MA, Traulsen A. Adaptive dynamics of exortion and compliance. PLoS One, 8: e77886.  💻 📃

  • Hilbe C, Nowak MA, Sigmund K. The evolution of extortion in iterated prisoner’s dilemma games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110: 6913–6918.  💻 📃

  • Hilbe C, Abou Chakra M, Altrock PM, Traulsen, A. The evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas. PLoS One, 6: e66490.  💻 📃

2012 and before

  • Hilbe C and Traulsen A. Emergence of responsible sanctions without second order free riders, antisocial punishment or spite. Scientific Reports (2012), 2: 458.  💻 📃

  • Hilbe C. Local replicator dynamics: A simple link between deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology (2011), 73: 2068–2087.  💻 📃

  • Hilbe C and Sigmund, K. Incentives and opportunism: from the carrot to the stick. Proceedings of the Royal Society B (2010), 277: 2427–2433.  💻 📃

  • Hilbe C. Contrition does not ensure cooperation in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos (2009), 19: 3877–3885.